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No more compulsory engagement 
The emancipation of German security policy
Justyna Gotkowska
Germany’s stance on Libya at the UN Security Council and its later decision 
not to take part in the military intervention gave rise to heated controversy 
both in Germany and abroad. At home, this was criticised as “an enormous 
mistake of historic impact”1; while abroad this raised questions about Ger-
many’s willingness to co-operate with its key Western allies. With its deci-
sion on Libya, Germany sealed the process of making its security policy 
independent from the stances of the US and France. It thus ceased to feel 
any compulsion to provide not only military engagement but also political 
support for overseas operations initiated by its key allies, even if these 
are legitimised by the UN Security Council. Germany’s stance, apart from 
finishing off a certain process, is also setting a starting point for a discus-
sion inside Germany about its military engagement in international security 
policy. This will bring about a more assertive and selective approach to co-
operation with NATO and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. 
Multilateralism in German security policy
Until	1994,	Germany	had	perceived	itself	exclusively	as	a	‘civilian	power’	(Zivilmacht)	and	
employed	primarily	diplomatic,	 economic	and	development	aid	 instruments	 in	 its	 foreign	
policy.	The	legal	and	historical	background	did	not	allow	Germany	to	use	military	means	
in	international	security	policy.	Germany	was	one	of	the	few	NATO	member	states	not	to	
have	(and	it	still	does	not)	an	official	national	defence	strategy,	approved	by	the	government;	
instead	its	Defence	Ministry	announces	‘political	and	defence	guidelines’	and	‘white	books’	
once	every	few	years.	The	Bundeswehr,	which	was	created	in	1955,	could	not	participate	
in	military	operations	abroad	until	the	early	1990s,	and	served	only	to	protect	Germany	as	part	
of	NATO.	Conventional	threats	waned	from	German	perspective	with	the	end	of	the	Cold	War.	
However,	soon	new	challenges	to	security	of	the	transatlantic	area	emerged,	such	as	ethnic	
and	regional	conflicts	and	international	terrorism.	After	reunification,	with	its	new	geopolitical	
position	Germany	had	to	relinquish	the	‘civilian	power’	concept	partly	by	choice	and	partly	
under	pressure.	Since	West	Germany	had	been	under	NATO’s	protective	umbrella	for	more	
than	 forty	years,	 the	allies	began	to	expect	 that	 the	reunified	Germany	would	 fully	engage	
in	NATO’s	 security	policy.	The	decision	of	 the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	 of	1994,	 stating	
that	Germany’s	membership	in	collective	security	systems	and	collective	defence	organisations	
and	the	fulfilment	of	the	tasks	this	membership	entails	do	not	breach	the	German	constitu-
tion,	made	it	possible.	Since	then	the	German	government	could	send	the	Bundeswehr	to	UN,	
NATO	and	EU-led	military	missions	abroad,	subject	to	prior	consent	from	the	Bundestag.
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From multilateralism… Since	 the	Constitutional	Court’s	 breakthrough	decision,	German	
security	policy	has	been	shaped	by	the	principle	of	what	German	analysts	call	the	multi-
lateralism	doctrine2.	It	ruled	out	independent	decisions	being	taken	within	NATO	and	the	
EU	contrary	to	the	policy	of	the	US	or	France.	It	also	assumed	Germany’s	political	support	
and	military	 contribution	 to	 overseas	 operations	 the	US	 and	 France	 called	 for	 and	 led.	
The	reasons	for	this	approach	were	historical	and	also	due	to	the	belief	that	it	was	neces-
sary	to	build	trust	 in	relations	with	its	allies	and	partners	who	could	feel	endangered	by	
the	 ‘remilitarisation’	 of	 a	 unified	 Germany	 and	 feared	 an	 independent	 policy	 from	 Ger-
many.	Inherent	in	this	doctrine	was	also	the	desire	to	strengthen	Germany’s	significance	in	
NATO,	to	enhance	its	influence	within	the	UN	(Germany	is	seeking	permanent	membership	
in	the	Security	Council)	and	to	reinforce	its	position	with	regard	to	France	and	the	United	
Kingdom	in	the	EU.	Germany,	wishing	to	
strengthen	its	influence	on	the	policies	of	
these	organisations,	undertook	to	increase	
its	participation	in	foreign	military	opera-
tions.	The	construction	of	the	multilateral-
ism	doctrine	was	based	on	 the	assump-
tion	 that	what	was	good	 for	 the	EU	and	
NATO	was	in	line	with	German	interests.	
This	doctrine	became	a	‘mantra’	for	sub-
sequent	 governments	 after	 1994	 and	
in	a	way	also	 justified	 the	Bundeswehr’s	
military	engagement	abroad	to	the	pacifist	public	in	Germany.	Since	the	mid-1990s,Germany	
has	been	gradually	enhancing	its	military	engagement;	in	terms	of	numbers,	tasks	and	ge-
ography.	At	 the	same	 time,	 it	embarked	upon	 the	 long-term	process	of	 transforming	 its	
armed	forces,	the	final	stage	of	which	is	the	reform	(currently	underway)	aimed	at	liquidat-
ing	conscription	and	reducing	the	number	of	military	personnel,	improving	its	performance	
and	optimising	its	expeditionary	skills.
…to compulsory engagement.	As	a	result	of	the	evaluation	of	the	international	security	sit-
uation	by	the	US	and	France	and	also	due	to	their	strategic	cultures,	the	West	became	more	
and	more	frequently	engaged	in	foreign	military	engagement	within	NATO,	the	EU	and	the	
UN.	Germany	felt	obliged	to	offer	political	support	and	military	engagement	in	an	increasing	
number	of	operations.	Meanwhile	Germany	saw	these	missions	as	not	necessarily	having	
a	positive	effect	on	the	security	situation	in	Germany	itself	and	as	complying	with	German	
interests.	Furthermore,	the	internal	political	costs	of	the	Bundeswehr’s	engagement	abroad	
started	 to	 be	 evaluated	 by	 subsequent	 governments	 as	 too	 high.	 The	 conclusions	 from	
the	military	operations,	e.g.	in	Afghanistan	or	Iraq	were	obvious	for	Berlin:	these	missions	
are	long-lasting,	expensive	in	economic	and	political	terms,	and	fail	to	bring	the	intended	
results.	However,	a	refusal	to	participate	in	the	West’s	overseas	operations	would	mean,	
for	 example,	 undermining	 the	 credibility	 of	 Germany	 as	 a	 responsible	 partner	 and	 ally.	
One	German	analyst	called	the	situation	Berlin	had	found	itself	in	a	‘multilateralism	trap’.	
It	can	be	defined	as	Germany’s	obligation	to	become	engaged	in	NATO-	and	EU-led	foreign	
military	operations	and	also	in	‘coalitions	of	the	willing’	formed	by	Germany’s	key	allies3.	
This	situation	can	be	illustrated	by	a	quotation	from	an	analysis	by	Klaus	Naumann,	former	
Inspector	General	of	the	Bundeswehr:	“as	regards	the	Bundeswehr’s	participation	in	foreign	
operations,	Germany	has	almost	in	all	cases	participated	in	missions	it	in	principal	did	not	
want	to	participate	in”4.
2	 Markus	Kaim,	‘Deutsche	
Auslandseinsätze	in	der	Multila-
teralismusfalle?’	in:	Stefan	Mair,	
Auslandseinsätze der Bunde-
swehr,	SWP-Studie,	September	
2007,	pages	43-49.
	
	
	
	
3	 Ibid.	
4	 Klaus	Naumann,	‘Wie	strate-
giefähig	ist	die	deutsche	Sicher-
heitspolitik?’	in:	Aus der Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte,	no.	48,	
Bundeszentrale	für	Politische	
Bildung,	23	November	2009,	
pages	10-17.
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Since the Constitutional Court’s break-
through decision, German security 
policy has been shaped by the principle 
of what German analysts call the multi-
lateralism doctrine . It ruled out inde-
pendent decisions being taken within 
NATO and the EU contrary to the policy 
of the US or France.
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A revision of the German security policy
A	gradual	withdrawal	 from	 the	doctrine	 of	multilateralism	and	 compulsory	 engagement,	
first	 in	 relations	with	 the	US,	 then	within	NATO,	and	 later	with	 regard	 to	France	within	
the	EU,	has	been	observed	since	Gerhard	Schröder’s	government.	The	most	recent	event	
in	 this	 process	was	 the	German	 stance	 on	 resolution1973	 concerning	 Libya	 at	 the	UN	
Security	 Council.	 Germany	 neither	 granted	 political	 support	 (it	 abstained	 from	 voting	
at	the	UN	Security	Council)	nor	engaged	in	the	execution	of	this	resolution	(it	did	not	take	
part	in	the	operation	of	the	‘coalition	of	the	willing’	led	by	France	and	the	United	Kingdom,	
and	later	by	NATO	in	Libya).	
A revision of the German policy towards the USA and within NATO. Unconditional	partner-
ship	with	the	US	and	co-operation	within	NATO	were	the	landmarks	of	German	policy	until	
the	end	of	the	Cold	War.	They	also	shaped	German	security	policy	throughout	the	1990s.	
A	departure	from	this	approach	happened	when	Chancellor	Gerhard	Schröder	(SPD)	de-
cided	to	oppose	the	US	intervention	in	Iraq	in	20035.	Schröder	not	only	ruled	out	Germa-
ny’s	participation	in	the	‘coalition	of	the	willing’	(even	if	it	had	been	legitimised	by	the	UN	
Security	Council);	he	also	made	opposition	to	the	US	on	the	Iraqi	question	a	subject	of	the	
campaign	in	parliamentary	elections	already	in	autumn	2002.	In	the	short	term,	Schröder’s	
decision	was	motivated	by	political	calcu-
lation.	And	this	was	successful:	the	SPD/
Green	 Party	 coalition	 won	 the	 elections	
to	the	Bundestag.	However,	in	hindsight,	
one	can	see	that	the	stance	taken	by	Ger-
many	at	that	time	marked	a	deep	change	
in	the	nature	of	German-US	relations	after	
the	 reunification	 of	 Germany.	 Germany’s	
security	 was	 no	 longer	 unconditionally	
dependent	 on	 US	 guarantees;	 Germany	
began	to	define	itself	as	a	medium-sized	power	interested	in	shaping	security	policy	struc-
tures	which	would	give	due	consideration	to	the	German	stance	and	increase	Germany’s	
influence	on	international	politics6.	Although	Germany	resumed	its	multilateral	rhetoric	after	
Schröder’s	decision	to	oppose	the	US	intervention	in	Iraq,	it	started	to	be	more	assertive	
towards	the	US	and	within	NATO.	This	is	best	shown	by	the	Bundeswehr’s	participation	
in	the	ISAF	operation	in	Afghanistan,	which	regularly	gave	rise	to	tension	between	Germany	
and	 the	US/NATO.	Subsequent	German	governments	have	successfully	 resisted	US	and	
NATO	pressure	to	increase	the	Bundeswehr’s	engagement	and	rejected	NATO’s	requests	to	
support	allies	engaged	in	fierce	clashes	in	the	southern	provinces	of	Afghanistan.	It	was	only	
the	deterioration	of	the	security	situation	in	2009–2010	in	the	northern	part	of	Afghanistan,	
where	the	German	military	contingent	is	stationed,	which	made	Germany	take	more	offen-
sive	military	action	in	this	region.
A revision of the German policy towards France and the EU. A	similar	process	–	Ger-
many’s	initial	engagement	followed	by	its	withdrawal	from	co-operation	–	has	been	taking	
place	with	regard	to	France	as	part	of	the	EU’s	security	policy.	The	European	Security	and	
Defence	Policy	(ESDP),	which	gained	momentum	in	1999	as	a	consequence	of	the	Balkan	
Wars,	 was	 initially	 being	 pushed	 through	 mainly	 by	 France	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	
However,	also	Germany	supported	its	civil	aspects.	After	the	controversies	regarding	the	US	
intervention	in	Iraq,	Germany	started	to	support	also	ESDP’s	military	dimension	and	to	treat	
France	as	its	priority	partner	in	this	area.	For	example,	it	took	part	in	the	‘praline	summit’	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
5	 Marco	Overhaus,	‘Die	deutsche	
NATO-Politik’,	Nomos,	2009,	
page	306.
	
	
	
	
6	 Michael	Staack,	‘Normative	
Grundlagen,	Werte	und	Interes-
sen	deutscher	Sicherheitspolitik’	
in:	Stephan	Böckenförde,	Sven	
Bernhard	Gareis,	Deutsche Si-
cherheitspolitik,	Verlag	Barbara	
Budrich,	2009,	pages	45-96.
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A gradual withdrawal from the doc-
trine of multilateralism and compulso-
ry engagement, first in relations with 
the US, then within NATO, and later 
with regard to France within the EU, 
has been observed since Gerhard 
Schröder’s government. 
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in	2003	and	–	with	France,	Belgium	and	Luxembourg	–	backed	the	creation	of	the	Euro-
pean	Security	and	Defence	Union.	In	2004,	Germany,	France	and	the	United	Kingdom	put	
forward	the	concept	of	European	Union	Battle	Groups.	By	strengthening	the	EU’s	position	
in	international	security	policy	Germany	wanted	to	gain	more	influence	on	the	policy	being	
formed	by	the	USA	in	NATO.	However,	following	the	EU	missions	in	the	Balkans,	Berlin	
remained	unable	to	answer	the	key	question:	What	are	the	German	interests	as	regards	
EU	security	policy	as	well	as	conducting	military	and	civil-military	operations;	Where,	how	
and	when	should	the	EU	become	engaged?	In	practice,	it	was	mainly	France	who	shaped	
the	debate	on	the	use	of	the	ESDP	instruments	and	often	treated	the	EU	as	a	tool	for	im-
plementing	its	own	policy.	For	this	reason	Germany	started	blocking	proposals	to	use	EU	
Battle	Groups	with	German	participation	 in	2006	(Chad)	and	2008	(Congo)7.	This	was	
an	effect	of	the	belief	commonly	shared	in	Germany	that	Germany	was	being	made	involved	
in	military	operations	which	serve	the	interests	of	other	member	states.	As	a	result,	Ger-
many	decided	not	to	participate	in	similar	missions	in	the	future.	At	least	since	the	French	
presidency	of	the	EU	in	the	second	half	of	
2008,	France	has	started	to	perceive	Ger-
many	as	a	country	which	slows	down	the	
development	of	European	security	policy.	
The	flagship	projects	of	the	French	presi-
dency	in	the	EU	aimed	at	revitalising	the	
ESDP,	namely	a	revision	of	the	European	
security	 strategy	 and	 the	 development	
of	military	capacity,	were	unsuccessful	partly	due	to	Berlin’s	policy8.	France’s	dissatisfaction	
with	the	co-operation	within	the	EU	so	far	(military,	operational,	political	and	that	of	the	
arms	industries)	gave	rise	to	the	military	and	political	deal	France	and	the	United	Kingdom	
struck	in	November	2010.	The	common	stance	of	these	two	countries	on	Libya	exempli-
fied	their	collaboration.	Meanwhile,	Germany’s	decision	to	abstain	from	voting	at	the	UN	
Security	Council	and	its	refusal	to	participate	in	the	international	and	later	NATO-led	opera-
tions	proved	Germany’s	increasing	assertiveness	primarily	with	regard	to	France,	its	largest	
European	partner	in	security	policy.	
As	with	Schröder’s	decision	concerning	the	intervention	in	Iraq,	in	the	short	term	the	Ger-
man	government’s	stance	on	the	intervention	in	Libya	was	strongly	affected	by	Germany’s	
internal	politics.	Local	parliamentary	election	campaigns	were	underway	in	two	important	
federal	states.	The	government	coalition	parties	(the	CDU/CSU	and	FDP)	did	not	wish	to	
lose	support	as	a	result	of	backing	and	participating	in	the	military	intervention	in	Libya.	
The	Foreign	Minister,	Guido	Westerwelle	(FDP),	hoped	that	the	German	abstention	would	
win	more	public	support	for	his	party.	In	the	longer	term,	however,	the	government’s	stance	
showed	a	profound	change	in	the	German	policy	towards	France	and	the	EU.	The	new	Ger-
man	assertiveness	resulted	partly	from	the	essential	political	and	economic	reinforcement	
of	Germany	within	the	EU	during	the	economic	crisis.	The	German	stance	on	Libya	can	be	
seen	as	a	symbolic	act	finishing	off	the	process	of	Germany	becoming	independent	from	the	
USA	and	France	in	international	security	policy.	
Possible scenarios of the development 
of German policy in NATO and the EU
The	German	stance	on	Libya	is	also	setting	a	starting	point	for	the	development	of	a	new	
German	approach	to	security	policy,	which	will	affect	a	further	development	of	NATO	and	
the	EU.	A	constant	element	of	 this	approach	will	be	 the	 focus	on	 the	development	and	
use	of	civil	 instruments	covering	diplomacy,	development	policy,	economic	and	 financial	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
7	 Claudia	Major	/	Christian	Möl-
ling,	‘EU-Battlegroups.	Bilanz	
und	Optionen	zur	Weiterentwic-
klung	europäischer	Krisenreak-
tionskräfte’	SWP-Studie,	August	
2010,	pages	22-23.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
8	 Bilateral	talks	between	the	
Defence	Ministries	of	France	
and	Germany	in	summer	and	
autumn	2010	on	enhancing	
military	co-operation	were	also	
unsuccessful.	Christian	Mölling,	
Sophie-Charlotte	Brune,	Marcel	
Dickow,	‘Finanzkrise	und	
Verteidigungskooperation’	SWP-
Arbeitspapier,	October	2010,	
page	9.
The German stance on Libya can be 
seen as a symbolic act finishing off 
the process of Germany becoming 
independent from the USA and France 
in international security policy. 
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9	 According	to	Germany,	civil	in-
struments	are	the	best	response	
to	the	new	types	of	threats	and	
have	thus	far	proven	sufficient	
to	secure	German	interests.	
10	 Anna	Kwiatkowska-Drożdż,	
‘The	natural	resources	deficit:	
the	implications	for	German	
politics,	OSW Commentary,	
8	February	2011.
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
11	 Justyna	Gotkowska,	‘The	Bun-
deswehr	reform	–	what	does	
Germany	need	a	professional	
army	for?,	OSW CEWEEKLY,	25	
May	2011.	
	
	
	
	
12	 Justyna	Gotkowska,	‘The	
German	vision	of	NATO’s	future	
–	The	Alliance	as	a	building	
block	of	Germany	and	European	
security’	OSW Commentary,	
24	April	2009.
co-operation,	and	police	and	military	co-operation9.	Germany’s	military	engagement	abroad	
however	is	now	under	debate.	An	analysis	of	German	discussions	and	policy	has	shown	that	
Germany	will	be	guided	in	the	future	mainly	by	its	own	interests	in	foreign,	economic	and	
security	policy.	Over	the	past	two	years,	precisely	the	issue	of	protecting	German	economic	
interests	–	not	only	the	security	of	maritime	routes	but	also	ensuring	supplies	of	natural	
resources	–	has	been	addressed	increasingly	often	in	the	public	discourse	concerning	the	
Bundeswehr’s	participation	 in	foreign	operations10.	What	will	be	Germany’s	policy	within	
NATO	and	the	EU	is	an	open	question.	Judging	from	German	debates	and	actions,	the	fol-
lowing	two	scenarios	seem	probable.
Assertive multilateralism… The	German	Defence	Ministry	appealed	for	the	development	
of	German	policy	 in	 this	direction	 in	May	2011	 in	 its	 ‘Political	and	Defence	Guidelines’.	
The	Defence	Ministry	points	to	the	need	to	reinforce	the	international	position	of	Germany	
through	actively	taking	part	in	crisis	and	conflict	management,	including	with	the	participa-
tion	of	the	Bundeswehr.	The	ministry	assumes	that	NATO	and	the	EU,	functioning	effectively	
in	political	and	military	terms,	are	necessary	to	preserve	the	German	model	of	development	
in	 the	 future,	 given	 the	 uncertainty	 over	
a	further	development	of	the	international	
security	environment.	Germany	should	be	
working	towards	strengthening	NATO	and	
the	EU	while		pursuing	an	assertive	policy	
in	these	organisations	by	influencing	their	
discourse	and	strategy	and	by	formulating	
clear	 conditions	 for	 carrying	 out	military	
operations	abroad.	Due	consideration	has	to	be	given	to	German	interests	at	the	time	of	
making	decisions	on	German	participation	in	foreign	military	operations.	However,	Germany	
should	also	consider	taking	part	in	operations	alongside	its	allies	which	bear	no	direct	im-
pact	on	its	interests	if	the	political	costs	of	refusal	could	be	too	high11.	
…or selective engagement? This	line	of	development	seems	likely	on	the	basis	of	discus-
sions	in	Germany	with	Libya	as	a	good	case	in	point	and	actions	taken	so	far	by	Germany	
within	NATO	and	the	EU.	In	this	scenario,	Germany	will	not	be	eager	to	become	engaged	
in	NATO-	and	EU-led	military	operations	and	will	prefer	the	use	of	diplomatic	solutions	and	
civil	instruments	to	prevent	and	manage	conflicts.	This	will	be	influenced	by	increasingly	
strong	energy	and	economic	connections	and	the	desire	to	develop	good	relations	with	Rus-
sia	and	the	other	BRIC	countries	(Brazil,	India	and	China),	as	well	as	the	wish	to	maintain	
Germany’s	positive	 image,	mainly	 in	 the	Muslim	countries.	NATO	and	 the	EU’s	 security	
policy	in	this	scenario	are	structures	which	can	be	used	when	needed	for	German	military	
engagement	abroad	(such	as	the	Atalanta	mission	aimed	at	securing	maritime	routes	along	
Somalia’s	coastline).	However,	they	should	be	rather	weak	so	as	not	to	impose	a	political	or	
military	obligation	on	Germany	to	support	operations	Germany	does	not	wish	to	participate	
in.	However,	 if	necessary,	 they	should	enable	Germany	to	 form	‘coalitions	of	 the	willing’	
and	to	conduct	foreign	military	operations.	
Given	the	policy	Germany	has	pursued	so	far	within	NATO	and	the	EU,	the	selective	en-
gagement	scenario	seems	more	likely	than	assertive	multilateralism.	In	the	case	of	NATO,	
the	shifting	of	the	focus	of	the	US	security	policy	towards	South-Eastern	Asia	and	the	Mid-
dle	East	and	the	desire	to	include	European	allies	in	counteracting	threats	in	these	regions	
have	little	in	common	with	German	interests.	Another	example	is	the	US	wish	to	enhance	
NATO’s	 tasks	 to	 ensure	 energy	 security	 or	 cyber	 security12.	 The	German	 reactions	 after	
The German stance on Libya is also 
setting a starting point for the develop-
ment of a new German approach to 
security policy, which will affect a fur-
ther development of NATO and the EU. 
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14	 The	most	recent	German	acti-
vities	in	the	EU	(the	German-
Swedish	Ghent	Initiative)	for	
enhancing	military	co-opera-
tion,	propagated	as	a	revival	
of	the	Common	Security	and	
Defence	Policy,	are	interpreted	
in	France	and	the	United	King-
dom	and	also	in	Germany	itself	
as	insubstantial	and	limited	to	
declarations	to	a	great	extent.	
15	 ‘Bericht	des	Generalinspek-
teurs	der	Bundeswehr	zum	
Prüfauftrag	aus	der	Kabinet-
tsklausur	vom	7.	Juni	2010’	
page	17,	www.bmvg.de
the	statement	by	the	US	Secretary	of	Defence,	Robert	Gates	can	be	seen	as	an	indicator	
of	the	German	stance	on	the	future	of	NATO.	Gates	said	that	if	the	European	allies	did	not	
start	investing	in	military	capacity	and	being	engaged	in	NATO’s	foreign	missions,	the	US	
may	not	be	willing	to	invest	further	in	NATO	and	European	security	in	the	future13.	Gates’s	
speech,	which	was	widely	commented	on	in	Europe,	did	not	lead	to	any	major	discussion	on	
the	future	of	NATO	in	Germany.	In	the	case	of	the	EU,	the	Libya	issue	convinced	Germany	
that	there	are	situations	when	it	is	difficult	to	reconcile	the	interests	and	approach	of	France	
with	security	policy	and	the	approach	of	Germany,	as	well	as	to	develop	EU	instruments	
as	part	of	the	common	security	policy.	Therefore,	Germany	will	still	not	wish	to	participate	
in	a	stronger	integration	of	the	armed	forces	within	the	EU,	despite	sticking	to	pro-European	
rhetoric	regarding	building	closer	military	co-operation14.	Germany	will	reject	solutions	which	
could	make	it	dependent	on	its	allies,	increase	the	political	pressure	on	Germany	to	carry	
out	certain	operations	or	block	actions	of	the	Bundeswehr15.	Germany	will	remain	scepti-
cal	about	the	operational	use	of	battle	groups.	Berlin	envisages	participation	in	enhancing	
co-operation	in	the	areas	of	training,	logistics	and	command	structures.	As	part	of	enhanc-
ing	European	co-operation,	Germany	will	still	be	interested	in	developing	the	civil	dimension	
of	the	EU’s	security	policy	as	well	as	supporting	and	promoting	the	German	arms	industry	
in	the	process	of	the	creation	of	the	‘European	technological	and	industrial	base.’
